Lieutenant General Dang Quan Thuy recalled the 1966-1967 dry season, when the U.S. and Republic of Vietnam initiated a large operation named “Junction City” to search and destroy the headquarter of the Central Office for South Vietnam. General Le Duc Anh, then the Chief of Staff of Regional Command, executed a rigorous, meticulous, and innovative combat plan.

Beating off the enemy on the spot                                 

In his interview with Dan Viet Electronics Newspaper, Lieutenant General Dang Quan Thuy, former Vice Chairman of the National Assembly, former President of Vietnam War Veterans Association, who spent part of his life fighting in the South and working with General Le Duc Anh, stated that the U.S. and Republic of Vietnam’s forces, after setting foot in Southern Vietnam, carried out many large- scale sweeps from 1965 to 1966, especially into Sai Gon suburbs, just to gain nothing but failure. They realized that more sweeps would just lead them to nowhere.

The enemy’s commander decided that attacks on the headquarter of the liberation forces were required. In 1967, they concentrated a huge force to search and destroy our headquarter and main forces.

It was stated in General Le Duc Anh’s memoir that the Central Office and Regional Command unanimously supposed the enemy would undertake an operation targeted at the Central Office and Regional Command to zap our headquarter and main forces. We should relocate our base of operations (by downsizing the manpower and organizations). The main forces stationed in the perimeter to conduct surprise attacks when the chances came. The forces on the spot would set to a new tactic which required them to stand by and then lash out.

To stand by in an uninhabited area, our officers and cadres from agencies of the Central Office and Regional Command would be organized into communal and hamlet guerrilla groups, which allowed optimizing the advantages of guerrilla combat.

General Le Duc Anh who then served as the Chief of Staff of Regional Command was entrusted with the on-the-spot forces. He drew out and executed the combat plan in a meticulous and rigorous manner. “Besides disseminating the guidelines, he worked out a painstaking plan to beat off the enemy’s operation. His resolution profoundly inspired the subordinate commanding officers,” said Lieutenant General Dang Quan Thuy.

Spreading out and giving chase tactic

As stated in General Le Duc Anh’s memoir, he briefed the units on the combat principle that involved organizing “fighting hamlets and communes,” standing by to fight on the spot and defending hamlets and communes. Where the enemy did not show up, our forces would spread out and give them chase, hunt them down, shoot for widespread attrition of the enemy, at the same time ensure the logistics, protect units and installations, and maintain the daily routine in the bases to fight in the long run.

Each unit of the Regional Command would be transformed into a “district combat team” and each “unit head” would act as a “district team leader.” The team would stand by and build the battlegrounds within the administrative area of the district with “fighting communes” and “fighting hamlets” which incorporated deep and wide-ranging serial layers of defense. Each fighting hamlet was composed of 20 to 30 people and associated with one guerrilla squad. Two to three “hamlets” formed one “commune.” There were 3 guerrilla teams in each commune; 2 mobile teams in each district. Fortifications mainly included personal pits and trenches with no reinforced tunnels. Personal pits were set in every five to ten meters; bullet-proof lids could be made if we had time. All agencies and units had to dig secret tunnels to store food for three months.

Lieutenant General Dang Quan Thuy recalled: “I worked with Le Duc Anh to thrash out the plan at department level, for instances, how to protect department-level areas and agencies. Le Duc Anh earnestly listened to our plan and challenged us on possible situations. No doubt he paid keen attention to the plan.”

Also in the words of Lieutenant General Dang Quan Thuy, to tackle the Junction City operation, his department complied with the guideline and tactic of spreading out and giving chase rather than pending ambush. “All members of the department organized themselves into combat teams armed with AK, B40, mines, and then dispersedly ambushed along the enemy’s operation trail. We destroyed some armors and kept hold of our area.”

After the fight against the sweep of the enemy, Lieutenant General Dang Quan Thuy had a chance to meet and report to his commander – Le Duc Anh. “He honored our accomplishments and asked about the hardship we had undergone. I emphasized the interrupted communication among chemistry units (Mr. Thuy was then the Head of Chemistry Department – Southern Command) as well as with other units due to the lack of vehicles. Right after that, Le Duc Anh discussed with the communications department and requested more facilities for chemical soldiers. Thanks to his help, we were enabled to make the interoperation of units and contributed to the failure of Junction City operation, “said Lieutenant General Dang Quan Thuy.

The U.S Junction City operation ended up failing in every aspect: searching and destroying our resistance headquarter, searching and destroying our main forces, destroying our resistance bases, and blocking the border. Furthermore, they suffered a huge loss. Thousands of American troops were removed out of the fight. More than 900 military vehicles and 112 artilleries were destroyed; 160 airplanes were shot down and destroyed; many well-trained units of the U.S. were heavily damaged, etc.

“The total forces mobilized for Junction City operation included 31 infantry battalions, 1 armored cavalry regiment and 8 battalions, 4 artillery regiments, 8 engineer battalions from the U.S. troops; 1 parachute brigade, 8 commando companies and 4 companies from the South Vietnam troops. The air forces consisted of 9 fleets of jet planes F100 and F5A; 5 armored helicopter battalions (CH47, HU1A, HU1B); 3 fleets of transport aircrafts including C123, C130; 22 L19, SR101, MOHOC reconnaissance aircrafts and some B52 planes.

That was the largest operation by the U.S. into the Western Tay Ninh bases, and also the most heavily lost one,” according to General Le Duc Anh’s memoir – Life and revolutionary cause.